Data
Litterature review on Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms
This is ongoing-work. Don’t hesitate to contact me for information or suggestions. This works is in line with previous litterature review (Bublitz et al. 2019, Scouflaire 2019). it focuses on the actors behaviors modeling in academic papers on Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms.
| Paper | Type of model | Market area | Design criteria | Market power | Uncertainty | Investment cycl. | Efficiency | Crossborder | High RES | Flexible Res. | CRM Typology | Source of risk | Actors | Actor asymmetry | Information asymmetry | Risk aversion | Technology | Cost type | Lead time | Penalty | Industrial decisions | EOM | Capacity market | Model resolution | Forward capacity auction | Capacity product | Clearing EOM | Clearing CRM | Publication |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Abani et al. (2016) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM - SR | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Abani, A.O., Hary, N., Rious, V., Saguan, M., 2018. The impact of investors’ risk aversion on the performances of capacity remuneration mechanisms. Energy Policy 112, 84–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.10.008. | |
| Abani et al. (2018) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand / EOM | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Peak | O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | - | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CRM / Decision / EOM ) | 4 years | 1 year | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Abani, A.O., Hary, N., Saguan, M., Rious, V., 2016. Risk aversion and generation adequacy in liberalized electricity markets: benefits of capacity markets. 2016 13th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). pp. 1–5. https:// doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2016.7521264. |
| Allcott (2012) | Analytique | PJM | yes | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM-C | - | Producers / Consumers | Incumbents / New Entry / RTP consumers / Flat rates consumers | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Allcott, H. (2012). Real-time pricing and electricity market design. | |
| Assili et al. (2008) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Assili, M., Javidi, D.B., Hossein, M., Ghazi, R., 2008. An improved mechanism for capacity payment based on system dy-mics modeling for investment planning in competitive electricity environment. Energy Policy 36, 3703–3713. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.enpol.2008.06.034. | |
| Astier et Lambin (2019) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | SR - RO | Demand / marg, cost | Producers / Consumers | - | yes | - | Single | - | - | - | - | - | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | Nicolas Astier et Xavier Lambin, « Ensuring Capacity Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity markets », The Energy Jour-l, vol. 40, n° 3, mai 2019. | |
| Bajo Buenestado (2017) | Analytique | Texas (ERCOT) | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly / Stackelberg | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | Fabra | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Bajo-Buenestado, R., 2017. Welfare implications of capacity payments in a pricecapped electricity sector: a case study of the Texas market (ERCOT). Energy Econ. 64, 272–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2017.03.026. | |
| Barrosso et al (2008) | Optimization | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | Multiple | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Multiple | - | - | - | Capacity | - | - | Decision loop | - | - | - | - | |
| Bhagwat et al. (2017a) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on Germany | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | yes | - | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Debt / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Bhagwat, P.C., Iychettira, K.K., Richstein, J.C., Chappin, E.J., de Vries, L.J., 2017a. The effectiveness of capacity markets in the presence of a high portfolio share of renewable energy sources. Util. Policy 48, 76–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup. 2017.09.003. | |
| Bhagwat et al. (2017b) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on the United Kingdom | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Fuel | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Debt / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 1 year / 4 years | 1 year / Multi years | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid for both Annuel et Multi Annuel Contracts | Bhagwat, P.C., Marcheselli, A., Richstein, J.C., Chappin, E.J., de Vries, L.J., 2017b. An a-lysis of a forward capacity market with long-term contracts. Energy Policy 111, 255–267. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.037. |
| Briggs and Kleit (2013) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC / Cournot | PPC / Cournot | Profit maximisation | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Briggs, R.J., Kleit, A., 2013. Resource adequacy reliability and the impacts of capacity subsidies in competitive electricity markets. Energy Econ. 40, 297–305. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2013.07.009. | |
| Brown, D., (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Capacity Demand / EOM | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Single | O&M / I(k) | - | - | Entry | - | M.U.A. | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Brown, D. P. (2018). The effect of subsidized entry on capacity auctions and the long-run resource adequacy of electricity markets. Energy Economics, 70, 205–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.01.002 | |
| Brown, D., (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Capacity Demand / EOM | Producers / Public Auth. | Partial monopoly / Stackelberg | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity / Mothballing | M.U.A. | M.U.A. | 6 stages ( Public Auth. / Invest / Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Brown, D.P., 2018. Capacity payment mechanisms and investment incentives in restructured electricity markets. Energy Econ. 74, 131–142. | |
| Cepeda and Finon(2011) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Invest. Unavailability | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 3 years | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Cepeda, M., Finon, D., 2011. Generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity markets. Energy Policy 39, 3128–3143. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011. 02.063. |
| Cepeda and Finon (2013) | SD | hypothetical based on France | - | - | - | - | - | - | yes | yes | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | 3 years | 1 year | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Cepeda, M., Finon, D., 2013. How to correct for long-term exter-lities of large-scale wind power development by a capacity mechanism? Energy Policy 61, 671–685. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.046. |
| Christiansen PN (2016) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | - | Producers / Consumerss | Flexible / Non flexible | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Optimization | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Christiansen PN. Equilibrium modeling of a power market with a capacity market designed to promote flexible capacity. NTNU; 2016 | |
| Creti and Fabra (2007) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Public Auth. | Monopole | - | - | Single | K | - | - | Capacity | PPC / monopoly | PPC / monopoly | 3 stages ( Public Auth. / CM / EOM ) | - | - | - | Creti, A., Fabra, N., 2007. Supply security and short-run capacity markets for electricity: why an ICAP mechanism is needed as part of standard market design. Energy Econ. 29, 259–276. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2006.04.007. | |
| Ehrenmann and Smeers (2011) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Fuel / Regulation | Producers | - | - | CVAR | Peak / Mid / Base | O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry | PPC | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | - | - | Ehrenmann, A., Smeers, Y., 2011. Generation capacity expansion in a risky environment: a stochastic equilibrium a-lysis. Oper. Res. 59, | |
| Elberg, C., & Kranz, S. (2013) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | M.U.A. | Cournot | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Elberg, C., & Kranz, S. (2013). Capacity Mechanisms and Effects on Market Structure. (14), 1–21. | |
| Fabra (2018) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Partial monopoly | yes | - | - | K | - | - | Entry | PPC | PPC / Partial monopoly | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Exogène : fixé par le First Best Sol. | Fabra N. A primer on capacity mechanisms. Energy Econ. 2018;75:323-335. | |
| Fan et al. (2012) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Regulation | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | Utility function | Peak / Mid / EnR | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry Capacity | PPC | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Fan, L., Norman, C.S., Patt, A.G., 2012. Electricity capacity investment under risk aversion: a case study of coal, gas, and concentrated solar power. Energy Econ. 34, 54–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.10.010. | |
| Franco et al. (2015 | SD | Great Britain | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | CM | Multiple | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | 4 stages ( Forecast / CM / Decision / EOM ) | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Franco, C.J., Castaneda, M., Dyner, I., 2015. Simulating the new British electricitymarket reform. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 245, 273–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor. 2015.02.040. | |
| Genoese et al. (2012) | Agent-Based | hypothetical based on Spain | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Capacity | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Genoese, M., Genoese, F., Fichtner, W., 2012. Model-based a-lysis of the impact of capacity markets on electricity markets. 2012 9th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2012). pp. 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM. 2012.6254704. | |
| Geze (2013) | Agent-Based | France | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand / Fuel | Producers / Consumers | - | - | Mean Variance | Multiple | - | - | - | Entry | - | PPC | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | |
| Gurkan et al (2013) | Stochastic | hypoothetical | - | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Gurkan, G., Ozdemir, O., & Smeers, Y. (2013). Generation Capacity Investments in Electricity Markets: Perfect Competition. Ssrn. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314862 | |
| Hach et al. (2016) | SD | Great Britain | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | Ramping Rates | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) / CO2 | - | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | Converging price | 1 year / Multi years | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hach, D., Chyong, C.K., Spinler, S., 2016. Capacity market design options: a dy-mic capacity investment model and a GB case study. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 249, 691–705. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.08.034. | |
| Hasani and Hosseini (2013) | SD | hypothtical | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | Raming rates | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PPC | PPC | Decision loop | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hasani, M., Hosseini, S., “Dy-mic assessment of capacityinvestmentinelectricitymarketconsideringcomplementary capacity mechanisms”. Energy, vol.36, 2011, pp 277-293 | |
| Hobbs et al. (2007) | SD | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers | - | - | Utility function | Peak | K | Yes | - | Entry | - | PPC | Decision loop | 4 years | 1 year | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Hobbs, B.F., Hu, M.-C., Inon, J.G., Stoft, S.E., Bhavaraju, M.P., 2007. A dy-mic a-lysis of a demand curve-based capacity market proposal: the PJM reliability pricing model. IEEE Trans. Power Syst. 22, 3–14. https://doi.org/10.1109/TPWRS.2006. 887954. |
| Höschle et al. (2017) | Stochastic | Belgium | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base / EnR | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Optimization | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Höschle, H., de Jonghe, C., Le Cadre, H., Belmans, R., 2017. Electricity markets for energy, flexibility and availability – impact of capacity mechanisms on the remuneration of generation technologies. Energy Econ. 66, 372–383. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.06.024. |
| Joskow and Tirole (2007 | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC / Cournot | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Joskow, P., Tirole, J., 2007. Reliability and competitive electricity markets. RAND J. Econ. 38, 60–84. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00044.x. |
| Joung, M., Baldick, R., Kim, J. (2009) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | yes | - | - | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | - | Single | - | - | Yes | - | - | Cournot | Nash equilibrium | - | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Joung, M., Baldick, R., & Kim, J. (2009). Strategic behavior in electricity capacity markets. Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Hawaii Inter-tio-l Conference on System Sciences, HICSS, 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2009.404 |
| Khalfallah (2009) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand | Producers | Stackelberg | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / I(k) | Yes | Yes | Capacity | Cournot | Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Khalfallah, M. H. (2009). A Game Theoretic Model for Generation Capacity Adequacy in Electricity Markets: A Comparison between Investment Incentive Mechanisms. Ssrn. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1405291 |
| Kim and Kim (2012) | Stochastic | South Korea | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PCC | PPC | Optimization | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Kim, H., Kim, S.-S., 2012. The resource adequacy scheme in the Korean electricity market. Energy Policy 47, 133–144. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.04.035. Kwoka, J., Madjarov, K., 2007. Making markets work: the special case of electricity. Electr. J. 20, 24–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2007.10.008. |
| Kraft E. (2017) | Agent-Based | France | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Multiple | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | - | - | - | Multiple | c / O&M / I(k) | Yes | - | Entry Exit | PCC | PPC | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Kraft E. (2017) Modelling a Decentralised Capacity Markets |
| Léautier (2016) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand | Producers / Consumers | RTP consumers / Flat rates consumers | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | Yes | Entry | PPC / Cournot | Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Léautier, T.-O., 2016. The visible hand: ensuring optimal investment in electric power generation. Energy J. 37, https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.37.2.tlea. |
| LeCadre, H., Soubra, M. (2014) | Analytique | hypothetical | yes | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | - | Producers / Consumers / Public Auth. | Stackelberg / Exogenous preferences | yes | - | Multiple | c | - | Yes | Capacity | PPC / Stackelberg | - | 4 stages ( Decision Prod, EOM Prod, Decision Demand, EOM Demand ) | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Hélène Le Cadre, Michaël Soubra. Designing Rules for the Capacity Market. [Research Report] Working Paper 2013-03-10, Chaire Modélisation prospective au service du développement durable. 2013, pp.36 - Les Cahiers de la Chaire. |
| Lynch andDevine (2017 | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | C¨P | Invest. Unavailability | Producers | - | - | - | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) / Refurbushment | - | - | Entry Exit / Refurbishment | PPC | PPC | Optimisation | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Lynch, M.Á., Devine, M.T., 2017. Investment vs. refurbishment: examining capacity payment mechanisms using stochastic mixed complementarity problems. Energy J. 38, https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.38.2.mlyn. |
| Maere d’Aertrycke et al. (2017) | Stochastic | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM - RO | Demand / Invest. Unavailability | Producers / Consumerss | - | - | CVAR | Peak / Base | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | 2 stages ( Décision / EOM ) | - | - | - | - | de Maere dAertrycke, G., Ehrenmann, A., Smeers, Y., 2017. Investment with incomplete markets for risk: the need for long-term contracts. Energy Policy 105, 571–583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.01.029. de Sisternes, F.J., Parsons, J.E., 2016. The Impact of Uncertainty on the Need and Design of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms in Low-carbon Power Systems. |
| Mastropietro, P., et al (2016) | Agent-Based | hypothetical | yes | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Invest. Unavailability | Producers | Incumbent / New Entrant | - | - | Peak | K | - | Yes | Entry | PPC | PPC | Cost minimization scenario | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Mastropietro, P., Herrero, I., Rodilla, P., Batlle, C., 2016. A model-based a-lysis on the impact of explicit pe-lty schemes in capacity mechanisms. Appl. Energy 168, 406–417. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.01.108. |
| McRaey, S., Wolak, F., (2019) | Analytique | Colombie | - | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | RO | - | Producers | Partial monopoly | - | - | Peak / Base | - | - | - | - | Cournot | - | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | McRae, S., Wolak, F. A. (2019). Market power and incentive-based capacity payment mechanisms. 1–44. |
| Meyer and Gore (2015) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | yes | - | - | RO - SR | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Exit | Markup | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | - | Meyer, R., Gore, O., 2015. Cross-border effects of capacity mechanisms: do uncoordi-ted market design changes contradict the goals of the European market integration? Energy Econ. 51, 9–20. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.06. 011. |
| Milstein I, Tishler A. (2019) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | Single | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | Cournot | - | 2 stages ( Decision / EOM ) | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Milstein I, Tishler A. On the effects of capacity payments in competitive electricity markets: Capacity adequacy, price cap, and reliability. Energy Policy. 2019;129(February):370-385. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2019.02.028 |
| Petitet (2017) | SD | hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Petitet, M, 2017. Effects of risk aversion on investment decisions in electricity generation: What consequences for market design. |
| Schneider et al (2017) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Single | c | - | - | - | Cournot | Cournot | Profit maximisation | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Forward Contracts and Generator Market Power: How Exter-lities Reduce Benefits in Equilibrium. Ian Schneider, Audun Botterud, and Mardavij Roozbehani. Proceedings of the US Association for Energy Economics, 2017. Presentation Slides, November 2017. |
| Schwenen (2014) | Analytique | hypothetical | - | yes | - | - | yes | - | - | yes | CM | Demand | Producers | - | - | - | - | - | - | Yes | Capacity | M.U.A. | M.U.A. | 2 stages ( CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Schwenen, S., 2014. Market design and supply security in imperfect power markets. Energy Econ. 43, 256–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.02.012. |
| Schwenen (2015) | Analytique | New York (ICAP) | yes | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | CM | - | Producers | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Capacity | - | M.U.A. | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Schwenen, S., 2015. Strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions with capacity constrained bidders: the New York capacity market. RAND J. Econ. 46, 730–750. https://doi. org/10.1111/1756-2171.12104. |
| Teirila, J. (2017) | Analytique | Irlande | - | yes | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | RO | - | Producers | Fringe comp. | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry Exit | PPC / Cournot | PPC / Cournot | 3 stages ( Decision / CM / EOM ) | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | Descending clock auction | Teirila, J. (2017) Market Power in the Capacity Market? The Case of Ireland, Cambridge Working Paper in Economics, 1727 |
| Traber (2017) | Stochastic | Germany, France, and Poland | - | - | - | - | yes | - | - | - | SR - CM | Demand | Producers / Consumers | - | - | - | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Capacity | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | Dual Prices | Dual Prices | Traber, T., 2017. Capacity remuneration mechanisms for reliability in the integrated European electricity market: effects on welfare and distribution through 2023. Util. Policy 46, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.005. |
| Winzer (2013) | Agent-Based | Great Britain | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CP - RO | Dermande | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | Mean Variance | Multiple | c / I(k) | - | - | Entry | PPC | - | Decision loop | - | - | Uniform Price / Multi Unit / seal bid | - | Winzer, C., 2013. Robustness of various capacity mechanisms to regulatory errors. 2013 10th Inter-tio-l Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). pp. 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1109/EEM.2013.6607374. |
| Peluchon (2019) | Stochastic | Hypothetical | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Benoît Peluchon (EDF), « Market Design and the Cost of Capital for Generation Capacity Investment » |
| Feng et Xu (2009) | Analytique | Chi- | - | - | yes | - | yes | - | - | - | CM | Demand | Producers / Public Auth. | - | yes | Utility function | Peak / Mid / Base | c / O&M / I(k) | - | Yes | - | PPC | PPC | Profit maximisation | - | - | - | - | D. Feng and Z. Xu, "Risk a-lysis of volume cheat strategy in a competitive capacity market," 2009 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting, Calgary, AB, 2009, pp. 1-7. |